With the Millennium Development Goals deadline only five years away, the international donor community faces significant challenges due to the global economic crisis, record government deficits, and simultaneous funding requests from nearly every multilateral development institution. This paper proposes a new World Bank financing model for creditworthy emerging economies, such as India and Vietnam, which currently receive billions of dollars in IDA assistance. In contrast to the current IDA-centric financing model, the IBRD would provide the same loan volumes to qualifying emerging economies while IDA would provide grant subsidies to buy down the concessionality level of these IBRD loans. As such, these countries would be held harmless both in terms of aid volumes and lending terms. By better leveraging the IBRD's balance sheet for loan capital, IDA then could re-allocate what it otherwise would have provided to emerging economies. For the current IDA-15 replenishment period, this would mean up to $7.5 billion in additional assistance for the world's poorest, most vulnerable countries. In relative terms, this would entail a 30 percent increase over existing levels. Of this, African countries would have received an additional $5.5 billion in IDA assistance. If donor governments find a way to scrape together increased contributions to IDA, then the allocation pie would grow by an even larger margin. The Inter-American Development Bank already successfully utilizes a similar approach for its lower middle-income and low-income country clients. It is time for World Bank shareholders to seriously consider the same resource-maximizing model. With the IDA-16 replenishment and IBRD general capital increase negotiations currently underway, they have an excellent window of opportunity to implement this win-win-win approach.
I. OVERVIEW
With the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) deadline only five years away, developing countries are making a final push to achieve their ambitious development targets. However, they currently face several significant headwinds in the fallout of global economic crisis. First, economic growth has slowed substantially in most developing countries. This has put pressure on economic activity, income levels, and government spending for social programs. Second, many donor countries are experiencing pressure on development assistance budgets due to their own economic contractions and sizable stimulus programs. Moreover, donors currently are confronted with simultaneous replenishments of nearly every multilateral concessional finance window 1 as well as general capital increase requests from nearly every multilateral nonconcessional finance window. 2 In this environment, it is highly unlikely that donors will be able to continue mobilizing significant increases in contribution levels for those multilateral institutions providing loans and grants to low-income countries.
Against this challenging backdrop, donor governments and international financial institutions (IFIs) should examine innovative approaches to mobilizing increased development financing for low-income countries. Specifically, this paper outlines a proposal for the World Bank to implement a new approach -the IDA Blended Financing Facility. Through this proposed facility, the International Development Association (IDA) would provide grant subsidies to buy down the concessionality level of International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) loans to qualifying "blend" and "hardened" term countries. By doing so, IDA would free up significant amounts of financing for the poorest countries while the World Bank would maintain existing assistance volumes and associated concessionality levels for slightly better off countries. The Inter-American Development Bank (IaDB) successfully utilizes a similar approach for its lower middle-income and low-income country clients. If this proposed approach was applied during the IDA-15 replenishment period, the poorest countries could have received up to $7.5 billion in additional IDA assistance while qualifying "blend" and "hardened" term countries would have maintained overall assistance volumes and associated loan concessionality levels.
II. IDA APPROACHING A CROSSROADS
IDA is approaching an interesting crossroads in terms of its geographic focus, scale, and clientele profile. Increasingly, recipient countries are becoming bifurcated into two distinct groups. The majority of its clients in Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and South Asia now enjoy access to the IBRD and international credit markets and are moving toward graduation from IDA altogether. Relatedly, these countries' are more advanced in terms of development results and have significantly lower vulnerabilities and needs. On the other hand, most recipient countries in SubSaharan Africa continue to have significant development challenges and vulnerabilities.
By illustration, this paper examines a number of development and institutional performance indicators across IDA classification groups, including: (1) the World Bank Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA); (2) income per capita; (3) life expectancy; (4) percentage of the population living on less than $1.25 a day; (5) the percentage of the population that lacks access to an improved water source; (6) primary education completion rates; and (7) child mortality rates. For comparative purposes, average scores for lower-and upper-middle income IBRDeligible countries are included as well. As figure 1 illustrates, IDA-only countries exhibit significantly greater development challenges, needs, and vulnerabilities. Compared to blend countries, their average life expectancy is 20 percent lower and the percentage of the population living on less than $1.25 a day is nearly twice as large. Blend and hardened term countries actually exhibit strong similarities to lower-middle income countries, which is consistent with their prospects for graduating from IDA assistance in the near-to medium-term. Given this stark contrast, several donor countries have pressed IDA to focus a greater percentage of its scarce financing resources on the poorest countries with relatively higher needs (i.e., IDAonly countries). Several options have been explored in recent years. A few European donors have proposed that IDA's performance-based allocation (PBA) formula specifically incorporate measures of vulnerability and/or development needs, which ceteris paribus would increase IDA allocations for more vulnerable countries.
4 By extension, countries with lower needs or vulnerabilities would receive smaller IDA allocations on a relative basis. While many other IDA donors recognize the pressing needs and vulnerabilities in most IDA-only countries, they have raised strong concerns about potentially reducing the PBA system's weighting of institutional performance.
Another option is to further reduce the concessionality level of IDA credits for blend and hardened term countries. In February 2010, World Bank management proposed that IDA harmonize its credit terms for blend and hardened term countries with those offered by the Asian 3 As more blend and hardened term countries graduate to the IBRD, sub-Saharan African will account for the overwhelming majority of IDA-eligible countries. If the former countries are excluded, Africa would account for roughly two-thirds of all IDA-eligible countries. A sizable share of the remaining non-African countries would be small countries with relatively modest IDA programs. Several key exceptions include Afghanistan, Bangladesh, and Nepal; all of which likely will continue to have sizable IDA envelopes and development programs. 4 According to IDA's existing performance-based allocation system, country assistance envelopes are based upon: (1) institutional performance (as measured by the Country Policy & Institutional Assessment and IDA portfolio performance); (2) population size; and (3) 7 At its core, this proposal would accelerate the credit repayment period for blend and hardened term countries, which could then be re-distributed to all IDA eligible countries in the future. However, the real impact of this change would materialize over the medium-to longterm (i.e., in 10 years or more) due to the grace period and credit amortization profile. As such, it would not address the immediate financing constraints for poorer countries with relatively higher development needs and/or vulnerabilities. This paper proposes an alternative approach for IDA donors' consideration -namely the IDA Blended Financing Facility.
III. IDA BACKGROUND
IDA Overview and Country Eligibility: IDA is one of the largest sources of development assistance for the world's poorest countries. It provides concessional loans (referred to as credits) as well as grants for debt vulnerable countries. Currently, seventy-nine countries are eligible for IDA assistance.
8 Since its inception, IDA has provided over $234 billion in financing to low-income countries 9 -averaging roughly $14 billion annually in recent years. Approximately half of IDA resources are channeled to African countries.
IDA Resource Mobilization: IDA is funded largely through donor contributions on a rolling three-year basis -referred to as replenishments. Since its inception in 1960, IDA replenishment resources have increased from $1 billion to over $42 billion during the IDA-15 replenishment period (July 2008 -June 2011 . This translates to an increase of approximately 8 percent per year in real financial terms.
10 During the IDA-15 replenishment, donor contribution commitments totaled approximately $25 billion -or about 60 percent of the total replenishment envelope. The largest donor contributors to IDA include: the United Kingdom, United States, Japan, Germany, France, Canada, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, and Sweden. IDA also receives net income transfers from the IBRD and International Finance Corporation (IFC) as well as borrower repayments of previously provided credits.
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Credit Terms: IDA offers different credit terms based upon income level and creditworthiness (see figure 2 below). First, IDA-blend terms are offered to countries that have access to IBRD loans, but are below IDA's operational income cutoff.
12 13 Second, IDA extends "hardened" terms to countries that exceed the operational income cutoff for two consecutive years.
14 Third, "hard" terms are available for blend countries with a per-capita income below the operational cutoff and an active IBRD borrowing program. IDA utilizes a relatively small portion of its total available resources for "hard" term lending. 15 Lastly, regular credit terms (IDA-only) are provided to countries that do not meet IBRD creditworthiness criteria, are below the operational income cutoff, and are not at risk of experiencing debt distress. Appendix I contains a complete country classification list. As noted previously, IDA is actively considering an adjustment of its respective blend and hardened terms, which would harmonize them with those offered by the Asian Development Fund. IDA-15 Assistance Volumes: During the IDA-15 Replenishment period, IDA projected that blend and hardened term countries would receive roughly 28 percent 17 and 6 percent, respectively, of the total available performance-based allocation envelope.
18 Of these categories, the largest recipients are: India, Pakistan, and Vietnam -which IDA estimated would receive roughly SDR 7.1 billion (approximately $11 billion). IDA-only countries were projected to receive the remaining roughly two-thirds in the form of credits and grants. Figure 3 below provides an overview of notional IDA-15 assistance levels for blend and hardened term countries. 12 The FY10 IDA operational cutoff is $1,135 (in 2008 GNI per capita terms). 13 Currently, IDA classifies 14 countries as so-called "blends" -Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Cape Verde, Dominica, Georgia, Grenada, India, Pakistan, St. Lucia, St. Vincent & the Grenadines, Uzbekistan, Vietnam, and Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe is considered a notional blend country since it no longer has access to IBRD loans due to its arrears status and overall lack of creditworthiness. 14 The following countries receive "hardened" credit terms: Angola, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bhutan, Bolivia, BosniaHerzegovina, Republic of Congo, Georgia, Guyana, Honduras, Moldova, and Sri Lanka. Several countries fall under both "blend" and "hardened" term categories, such as: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Georgia. In this event, IDA provides "hardened" terms to the respective country. 15 IDA reduces grant assistance volumes to countries at risk of debt distress by 20 percent to offset administrative costs and ensure greater equity between IDA recipients in net present value terms. During the IDA-15 Replenishment Agreement, IDA shareholders agreed that 7 percent (of the total 20 percent grant volume reduction) would be made available for "hard" term lending. In practice, India and Pakistan are the largest recipients of these terms. 16 As of September 2008. Grant element calculations based on IDA's website tool (see http://siteresources.worldbank.org/IDA/Resources/GrantElementCalculator.htm). 17 IDA capped the assistance volumes for India and Pakistan at 18 percent of the total IDA-15 envelope. Without a cap, India alone would receive roughly 60 percent of all available IDA assistance based upon its population size, income level, and country performance rating. 18 A portion of IDA resources are provided outside its regular performance-based allocation system, such as: arrears clearance grants and funding for regional projects. 
V. IDA BLENDED FINANCING FACILITY
This paper proposes that the World Bank implement a new financing structure for IDA blend and hardened term countries. This approach is based on three guiding principles: (1) maintain the PBA's current institutional performance weighting; (2) maintain overall assistance volumes and concessionality terms for relatively better off countries (i.e., blend and hardened term countries); and (3) dramatically increase assistance volumes for IDA-only countries with greater development needs and/or vulnerabilities.
Operational Modalities: First, IDA would determine the projected replenishment envelopes for all eligible countries, including blend and hardened term countries. This would not entail any changes to its current resource allocation approach. However, the projected resource envelope for qualifying blend and hardened term countries would be met through IBRD non-concessional loans -instead of IDA credits. In this manner, blend and hardened term countries would receive the same assistance volume as under IDA's current methodology. The key difference is that the terms extended would be non-concessional. Third, the IDA Blended Financing Facility would provide grant resources to cover blend and hardened term countries' IBRD loan charges and interest payments. More specifically, IDA would provide an upfront grant that is equivalent to the net present value of these charges and interest payments over the life of the loan. In turn, blend and hardened term countries would be responsible only for providing IBRD loan principal repayments. The central benefit is shifting the loan capital requirements from IDA to the IBRD, which has the effect of freeing up scarce IDA resources for countries with greater needs and/or vulnerabilities. Appendix II includes graphical illustrations of the IDA-15 resource flow implications by IDA term classification (i.e., blend, hardened term, and IDA-only). The IBRD offers a number of customized financing terms to meet its clients' needs. First, the IBRD Flexible Loan allows borrowers to customize the repayment terms (i.e. grace period, repayment period and amortization profile) to meet debt management or project needs. Final maturity can be up to 30 years, including grace period. The Flexible Loan interest rate is reset semi-annually based on the six-month LIBOR plus a variable or a fixed spread. 20 In addition, a one-time front-end fee of 0.25 percent of the loan amount is charged at the beginning of the project. In addition, the IBRD offers a fixed rate single currency loan with maturities of six, nine, and twelve years. 21 As of December 2009, the interest rate was 3.88 percent for a fixed single current loan with a grace period of 3 years and a maturity of 12 years. 22 Moreover, the IBRD offers a number of hedging products to manage financial risks, such as: currency swaps, interest rate conversions and swaps, interest rate caps and collars, and commodity swaps. 26 . For a $100 million IBRD flexible fixed rate loan with a 30 year maturity, borrower repayments would total roughly $150 million in nominal terms -of which, $50 million would be interest payments and fees. Applying the 5.30 percent discount rate, this loan would have a grant element of roughly 31 percent. An IBRD flexible fixed spread loan with a 20 year maturity would have a grant element of 26 percent. Under the proposed approach, IDA would provide an upfront grant equivalent to the interest payments and front-end fee in NPV terms. For the 30 year IBRD loan, this grant would total $29 million for every $100 million in new lending. For the 20 year IBRD loan, the IDA grant would total $24 million. Put differently, IDA would save 71 cents and 76 cents of every dollar currently provided to blend and hardened term countries. These savings would be even greater if IDA harmonizes its credit terms for blend and hardened term countries with those of the Asian Development Bank. 25 For simplicity, this paper assumes that loan disbursements are spread evenly over three years. In reality, IBRD average loan disbursement profiles likely will be longer -especially for development projects. As such, this approach utilizes a conservative assumption. 26 Based upon the average US Dollar denominated CIRR rate between August 2009 and February 2010 (equal to 4.05 percent) plus a 1.25 percent discount rate margin. Differentiated discount rate margins and historical CIRRs can be found on the OECD website (www.oecd.org). 27 As noted previously, this would reduce the grant element of IDA credits for blend and hardened term countries. By extension, the required IDA subsidy would be lower to maintain the grant element of the blended financing operation.
IBRD Loan Terms Volume Grant Element
Interest While only blend countries currently are eligible for IBRD lending, some hardened term countries may be deserving borrowers under the proposed blended financing approach. As such, this paper examines a number of relevant creditworthiness indicators for both blend and hardened term countries, including: (1) gross national income per capita; (2) country credit rating 29 ; (3) external indebtedness ratios; and (4) 31 The World Bank/IMF Debt Sustainability Framework applies debt distress thresholds based upon respective countries' CPIA scores and external indebtedness ratios. For "strong" performing countries (CPIA score greater than 3.75), the relevant thresholds are: (1) NPV external debt-to-GDP ratio of 50 percent; (2) NPV external debt-toexport ratio of 200 percent; and (3) debt service-to-export ratio of 25 percent. For "medium" performing countries (CPIA score greater than 3.25 and less than 3.75), the relevant thresholds are: (1) NPV external debt-to-GDP ratio of 40 percent; (2) NPV external debt-to-export ratio of 150 percent; and (3) debt service-to-export ratio of 20 percent. For "poor" performing countries (CPIA score less than 3.25), the relevant thresholds are: (1) NPV external debt-to-GDP ratio of 30 percent; (2) NPV external debt-to-export ratio of 100 percent; and (3) debt service-to-export ratio of 15 percent. Projected IDA Resource Savings: During the IDA-15 replenishment period, the 16 aforementioned blend and hardened term countries potentially eligible for the IDA Blended Financing Facility approach were projected to receive 26 percent of the total available assistance envelope. If the IBRD provided the projected lending capital for these countries -coupled with upfront IDA grants to cover interest payments and loan charges -IDA would have retained roughly SDR 4.9 billion ($7.5 billion) of its available IDA-15 resources for the poorest, most vulnerable countries. If these estimated savings were re-allocated to IDA-only countries based upon the performancebased allocation system, African countries could have received an additional $5.5 billion in assistance during the IDA-15 period. Importantly, IDA-15 assistance volumes for HIPCs would have increased by over $4.6 billion. These additional flows would be more than enough to address the MDRI netting out issue, which IDA Deputies currently are considering in the IDA-16 replenishment negotiation. 33 Moreover, post conflict countries and countries re-engaging with IDA after a prolonged hiatus would have received an additional $1.1 billion. Appendix IV provides the notional country-by-country simulation impact if the estimated savings were reallocated to IDA-only countries. 33 Under the MDRI agreement, IDA gross assistance volumes to MDRI beneficiary countries are reduced by the amount of debt service forgiveness provided during the respective replenishment period. These assistance volumes are then re-allocated to IDA-only countries through the performance-based allocation system. For some MDRI beneficiaries, this so-called netting out has reduced gross IDA assistance volumes substantially. As such, IDA management has proposed a number of policy options, such as declaring a moratorium on the MDRI netting out during the IDA-16 replenishment period.
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Active Debt Service Profile: One important consideration is the debt service impact for qualifying blend and hardened term countries. Given the shorter IBRD loan grace period, recipient countries would begin making principal payments sooner than with corresponding IDA blend and hardened term credits. This has the effect of shifting the loan amortization profile forward (see figure 10 below). Appendix V includes graphical debt service comparisons for: (1) an IDA blend term loan and the blended IBRD/IDA structure with a 30 year maturity; and (2) and IDA hardened term loan and the blended IBRD/IDA structure with a 20 year maturity. IMF and World Bank staff would need to examine the impact of debt service profile shifts in the context of countries' periodic debt sustainability analyses. IBRD Capital and Loan Loss Provisioning Impact: A third consideration will be the impact on IBRD resource and loan loss provisioning requirements. The ultimate resource requirements will depend upon the IBRD's determination of country creditworthiness. Nonetheless, additional IBRD market borrowing and donor capital subscriptions will be necessary to implement this 34 Based on a $100 million loan. IBRD debt service figures are based on its repayment profile calculator tool (see http://treasury.worldbank.org/bdm/htm/Repayment_Profile_Calculator.html). IDA blend credit term figures are based on: (1) grace period of 10 years; (2) principal repayments of 2.5 percent annually between years 11-20 and 5 percent annually between years 21-35; and (3) service fee of 0.75 percent of the total outstanding credit balance. IDA hardened credit term figures are based on: (1) grace period of 10 years; (2) principal repayments of 10 percent annually between years 11-20; and (3) a service fee of 0.75 percent of the total outstanding credit balance. 35 The U.S. Dollar denominated CIRR would increase with higher LIBOR levels. This would raise the respective discount rate used to determine the loan's overall grant element, thereby limiting the impact on required IDA grant buy-down figures. However, this paper maintains the discount rate of 5.30 percent for conservative purposes. proposed approach. Currently, there is a window of opportunity to address these issues since shareholders are actively considering an IBRD general capital increase. The IBRD also will need to carefully consider loan loss provisioning (LLP) requirements. The IBRD's LLP guidelines and country-specific provisioning are not publicly available. As figure 7 illustrated, the creditworthiness profile of prospective blend and hardened term countries is similar to those countries that graduated from IDA assistance over the last decade. Nonetheless, the loan volumes envisioned under this proposal likely would have a negative impact on the IBRD's overall portfolio. However, this would not impact the IBRD's AAA credit rating or overall financial integrity.
IDA Financial Integrity: A fourth consideration is the impact on IDA reflows over time. Under the proposal, IDA would forego principal and interest payments by shifting from traditional credits for blend and hardened term countries to upfront grants to increase the concessionality of the blended financing operation. At its core, this entails a tradeoff between: (1) maximizing IDA resources for the poorest and most vulnerable countries now; and (2) maximizing IDA's projected credit reflows over the next four decades. The latter rationale is based upon the premise that many countries will require IDA assistance for an additional two or three generations. As such, donors should not undermine its self-sustaining financial capacity. To offset this potential concern, IDA could utilize a highly concessional loan instead of a grant to increase the grant element of the blended financing operation. 36 The IaDB utilizes this approach for its low-income country borrowers (see section VI). While this would provide IDA with additional recycled resources for beneficiary countries 40 years in the future, it also would require a larger credit volume to buy-down the concessionality level of the blended financing operation.
VI. INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK PRECEDENT
In 2007, the IaDB implemented a number of ambitious measures that reformed its approach to providing assistance to low-income countries. 37 Traditionally, the IaDB's concessional finance window -the Fund for Special Operations (FSO) -solely provided concessional loans to eligible countries. 38 Under its new approach, the IaDB provides blended financing to low-income countries to leverage the scarcity of available FSO concessional resources. The IaDB's nonconcessional window -Ordinary Capital (OC) -provides market-based loans with a maturity of 30 years to FSO-eligible countries. 39 In turn, the FSO provides loans with a 90 grant element to increase the overall concessionality level of the blended operation. 40 The ratio between these two financing sources is designed to meet specific concessionality level targets based upon income criteria (see figure 11 below). In 2009, the IaDB provided $716 million its low-income country recipients. Of this, the FSO provided $228 million in concessional loans or grants while the OC provided $488 million in non-concessional loans. Through this blended approach, the IaDB was able to provide greater than three times the assistance volume to low-income countries than otherwise possible if only FSO resources were utilized.
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In addition, the IaDB provides blended financing for its lower middle-income country borrowers.
42 Specifically, the FSO provides annual grant transfers to a separate entity -the Intermediate Financing Facility (IFF) -which, in turn utilizes the resources to buy-down OC loan interest rates. Through these two blended financing approaches, the IaDB ensures that countries' financing terms gradually transition over time as its income per capita level increases. While this paper only proposes new blended financing for blend and hardened term countries, the World Bank could pursue a more gradual and nuanced approach similar to the IaDB's approach. 
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper outlines an innovative financing model for the World Bank's low-income borrowers. The blended approach achieves three central objectives: (1) maintain IDA's existing performance-based allocation system; (2) maintain assistance volumes and overall concessionality levels for IDA blend and hardened term countries; and (3) dramatically increase IDA assistance for the world's poorest and most vulnerable countries. Moreover, it addresses donors' budgetary burdens and inability to continue providing substantial IDA contribution increases. If applied during the IDA-15 replenishment period, IDA-only countries would have received up to $7.5 billion in additional resource flows. Of this, African countries would have received roughly $5.5 billion. This financing would have a dramatic impact on poor countries' final push to achieve their MDG targets -especially as their own government budgets have declined due to the global economic crisis. With the IDA-16 replenishment and IBRD general capital increase negotiations currently underway, World Bank shareholders have an excellent window of opportunity to implement this win-win-win approach. 41 This assumes that the FSO does not mobilize additional resources through a donor replenishment. 42 Currently, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Paraguay and Suriname are eligible for IFF subsidies.
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